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THE VALUE OF “THINKING LIKE A LAWYER”
MICHELLE M. HARNER*
“Your business as lawyers is to see the relation between your
particular fact and the whole frame of the universe.”
—Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.1
I. INTRODUCTION
What does it mean to “think like a lawyer”?  Many commentators
have debated this issue.2  Some explain the concept as a narrow ana-
lytical task performed in the legal context.3  Others, such as Oliver
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1. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION vii (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2. See, e.g., KENNETH J. VANDEVELDE, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: AN INTRODUCTION TO
LEGAL REASONING 1 (1996) (“The phrase ‘to think like a lawyer’ encapsulates a way of
thinking that is characterized by both the goal pursued and the method used.”); Nancy B.
Rapoport, Is “Thinking Like a Lawyer” Really What We Want to Teach?, 1 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRIT-
ING DIRECTORS 91, 93–94 (2002) (noting various interpretations of “thinking like a law-
yer”); David A. Garvin, Making the Case, HARV. MAG., Sept.–Oct. 2003 at 56, 58–59
(discussing the historical development of the case method and “thinking like a lawyer”).
For a particularly insightful discussion of thinking about “thinking like a lawyer,” see gener-
ally RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR LEGAL THINKING 2 (3d ed.
1997).
3. For example, “thinking like a lawyer” is often couched in terms of case synthesis or
litigation. See generally, e.g., Jane Kent Gionfriddo, Thinking Like a Lawyer: The Heuristics of
Case Synthesis, 40 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1, 7 (2007) (“[T]o operate successfully in their many
roles, lawyers must be able to synthesize groups of cases effectively.”); Peter T. Wendel,
Using Property to Teach Students How to “Think Like a Lawyer”: Whetting Their Appetites and
Aptitudes, 46 ST. LOUIS L.J. 733, 735–44 (2002) (claiming that Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805)—a classic property case involving possessory rights to a dead fox—“is
the perfect case for giving students a taste of what it means to ‘think like a lawyer,’” and
recommending that first-year property courses compare student-prepared briefs with the
court’s opinion and consider the case within the litigation context).  This Essay uses the
concept of “thinking like a lawyer” in a broader sense than the traditional case-method
dialogue approach used in law school; I also intend the term to invoke the skill set utilized
by lawyers in practice. See, e.g., John Lande, Developing Better Lawyers and Lawyering Practices:
Introduction to the Symposium on Innovative Models of Lawyering, 2008 J. DISP. RESOL. 1, 2 (ex-
plaining the limitations of traditional case-method dialogue identified by the 2007 Car-
390
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Wendell Holmes, Jr., suggest that the concept is something more uni-
versal: a skill set inculcated in lawyers but applicable well beyond the
legal field.4  Perhaps this explains the value and application of the
skill set in business, finance, and other professions.5
This Essay does not seek to resolve the debate, but it embraces
the latter conception of “thinking like a lawyer” for purposes of con-
sidering what lies ahead for lawyers and the legal profession generally.
negie Report, which envisions lawyering as requiring a more complete analytical skill set
that connects basic factual analysis “ ‘with the rich complexity of actual situations that in-
volve full-dimensional people . . . [and considers] the social consequences or ethical as-
pects of the conclusions’”).
4. See, e.g., ALDISERT, supra note 2, at 23 (“[The] case method is all-important because R
a law school education is designed to teach you how to solve complex problems.  Even if
you never practice law a day in your life, upon graduation you will be equipped for a galaxy
of positions in both the private and public sectors for here there is a constant demand for
skilled problem solvers.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Reflections on Twenty Years of Law Teach-
ing, 56 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 13, 15–16 (2008), available at http://uclalawreview.org/
pdf/discourse/56-2.pdf (acknowledging that legal thinking “‘is a matter of learning how to
reason and argue, in some ways that lawyers share with everyone else, and in other ways
that are peculiar to lawyers (e.g., arguments from authority are not fallacious in the law).’”
(quoting Brian Leiter, The “Socratic Method”: The Scandal of American Legal Education, LEITER
REPORTS: A PHIL. BLOG (Oct. 20, 2003, 12:15 PM), http://leiterreports.typepad.com/blog/
2003/10/the_socratic_me.html)); Marc A. Loth, Limits of Private Law: Enriching Legal Dog-
matics, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1725, 1732–33 (2007) (urging a broader approach to thinking
like a lawyer and observing that “[a] lawyer who understands law in its context will never
restrict herself to the strictly legal domain, but will integrate sociological, economic, or
psychological expertise”); cf. Karen H. Rothenberg, Recalibrating the Moral Compass: Ex-
panding “Thinking Like a Lawyer” into “Thinking Like a Leader,” 40 U. TOL. L. REV. 411, 416
(2009) (“While ‘thinking like a lawyer’ mandates the intricate dissection and reconstruc-
tion of facts and case law, ‘thinking like a leader’ further requires a student to consider the
impact of his or her decisions and actions on the community as a whole, especially when
community considerations conflict with a client’s interests.”). But see Jeffrey M. Lipshaw,
Models and Games: The Difference Between Explanation and Understanding for Lawyers and
Ethicists, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 613, 614–16 (2008) (exploring what it means to “think like a
lawyer,” commenting that “‘thinking like a lawyer’ . . . is very much a cultural phenomenon
of the last 150 years or so,” and suggesting the use of “games and models as one way of
thinking about thinking”).  For a general discussion of necessary lawyering skills and legal
education, see also ABA, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION:
NARROWING THE GAP 135–41 (1992) [hereinafter MACCRATE REPORT], available at http://
www.abanet.org/legaled/publications/onlinepubs/maccrate.html (providing and explain-
ing a “statement of fundamental lawyering skills and professional values”), and WILLIAM M.
SULLIVAN ET AL., THE CARNEGIE FOUND. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING, EDUCATING
LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION OF LAW 1–20 (2007).
5. See, e.g., Eric Torbenson, Law Degrees Increasingly Attractive for CEO Candidates, DAL-
LASNEWS.COM (Sept. 2, 2008, 7:22 AM), http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/
bus/stories/090208dnbusceolaw.386fbf5.html (“Of Fortune magazine’s latest list of the 50
largest U.S. companies, nine CEOs have law degrees–the second-most common degree
behind a master’s degree in business.”).  One top executive explained that her law school
training “‘taught [her] to identify issues and solve problems.’” Id.  Another stated that his
law degree aided in senior management, which requires an understanding of public policy,
by forcing him to understand and argue all sides of an issue. Id.
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I use the phrase “key analytical skills” to reference a particular set of
abilities: spotting and dissecting issues, identifying applicable tools
and potential barriers, embracing ambiguity, and thinking creatively
to resolve issues.6  Admittedly, it takes more than thinking like a law-
yer to be a good practicing lawyer.7  Nevertheless, the key analytical
skills form a solid foundation from which a lawyer can excel and serve
the interests of her clients.
Not surprisingly, commentators who evaluate the future of the
legal profession are themselves lawyers, and they use their key analyti-
cal skills in developing and supporting their theses.  For example,
Larry Ribstein and Richard Susskind separately explore the future of
lawyers and law firms in their written works.8  They identify and dissect
6. See, e.g., Barbara Bintliff, From Creativity to Computerese: Thinking Like a Lawyer in the
Computer Age, 88 LAW LIBR. J. 338, 339 (1996) (explaining that thinking like a lawyer repre-
sents a “method of organizing and categorizing the parts of a legal problem that allows for
its discussion and possible solution, using a logical reasoning process” and discussing the
elements of this method); Judith Wegner, Better Writing, Better Thinking: Thinking Like a
Lawyer, 10 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 9, 12 (2004) (“‘[T]hinking like a lawyer’
involves dealing with uncertainty in a very profound way.”).
7. See generally MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 138–40 (enumerating R
“[f]undamental [l]awyering [s]kills,” which include counseling, communication, negotia-
tion, and legal reasoning); Rapoport, supra note 2, at 93–94 (acknowledging that skills R
included in the concept of thinking like a lawyer, while “essential to the development of a
lawyer,” place too much “focus on the ‘thinking’ part, rather than on the transition from
‘thinking’ to ‘doing’ to ‘being’”).  Many commentators have criticized traditional legal ed-
ucation for not sufficiently recognizing this distinction. See, e.g., Afra Afsharipour, Incorpo-
rating “Business” in Business Law Classes, 8 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 1, 1–2 (2007) (arguing that
the “traditional methods” by which legal education fosters analytical skills, such as “reading
cases and creating a foundation in various legal theories[,] . . . may not be sufficient to
train graduating law students who decide to pursue a transactional career”); Alex M. John-
son, Jr., Think Like a Lawyer, Work Like a Machine: The Dissonance Between Law School and Law
Practice, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1231, 1233 (1991) (arguing that “[l]egal educators, with our
increasing orientation away from law and the practice of law, are failing to adequately
prepare students to practice law”); Tina L. Stark, Thinking Like a Deal Lawyer, 54 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 223, 223 (2004) (“Although the academy prides itself on teaching students to think
like a lawyer, for the most part we teach students to think like litigators.  To teach our
students to be deal lawyers, we must teach them to think like deal lawyers.” (footnote omit-
ted)); Joan Heminway, Minding Our Own Business Forum: Yes to Skills Training, but Lawyering
Skills First (or at Least Simultaneously), CONGLOMERATE (Apr. 19, 2010), http://www.thecon-
glomerate.org/2010/04/minding-our-business-forum-yes-to-skills-training-but-lawyering-
skills-first-or-at-least-simultaneou.html (advocating the teaching of legal skills that will en-
able students “to do meaningful work early on,” such as planning and drafting contracts
and litigation documents).
8. See, e.g., RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS?: RETHINKING THE NATURE OF LE-
GAL SERVICES 1 (2008) (“My aim is to explore the extent to which the role of the traditional
lawyer can be sustained in coming years in the face of challenging trends in the legal
marketplace and new techniques for the delivery of legal services.”); Larry E. Ribstein, The
Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749, 752 (“This Article focuses on the structure and
function of large law firms.  Its goal is to analyze big law firms as a type of business firm and
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issues that indicate instability in the profession and a need for change.
These issues include inefficiencies in the practice,9 the emerging role
of technology,10 hourly billing,11 and the economic structure of law
firms.12  They then—to varying degrees—discuss the applicable law,13
industry standards,14 societal norms,15 and potential barriers16 neces-
sary to analyze the issues.  Ribstein and Susskind recognize the ambi-
guity inherent in this analysis and present their own predictions for
resolution.17  Although they invoke the same analytical method, they
emphasize different issues and reach slightly different conclusions.18
to question whether these firms are economically viable under modern business
conditions.”).
9. Cf., e.g., SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 148–53 (“At worst, hourly billing can tempt law- R
yers to dishonesty.  At best, it is an institutional disincentive to efficiency.”); Ribstein, supra
note 8, at 768–71 (arguing that hourly billing “can exacerbate lawyer-client agency costs R
because it tempts law firms to spend unnecessary time and client money”).
10. See SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 99–145 (identifying and explaining “disruptive legal R
technologies” that are “significant for lawyers of today”); Ribstein, supra note 8, at 761, R
780–82 (identifying technical advances and positing that “[t]echnology potentially could
transform the delivery of legal services”).
11. See SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 148–53 (defining hourly billing as a barrier to the R
alignment of clients’ and law firms’ commercial interests); Ribstein, supra note 8, at 768–71 R
(outlining “the decline of hourly billing”).
12. See SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 28–36 (explaining that as a result of market pressures R
and emerging information technologies, the provision of legal services has moved away
from “‘bespoke’ legal service . . . [or] traditional, hand-crafted, one-to-one consultative
professional service” and toward commoditization); Ribstein, supra note 8, at 753–97 (in- R
troducing “the standard economic model of the law firm,” discussing “this model’s implica-
tions for the structure and governance of large firms,” and proposing “one kind of
successor to the Big Law business model”).
13. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 8, at 803–13 (highlighting “the regulatory roadblocks R
that are preventing alternative models of delivering legal services from taking center stage
and the forces that might help penetrate these barriers”).
14. See, e.g., id. at 760–68 (discussing traditional practices and business standards in the
legal profession and the various client, business, and societal pressures that impact those
standards).
15. See, e.g., SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 19–23 (summarizing changes in various indus- R
tries caused by technological developments and noting some societal expectations regard-
ing the technology behind these changes—themes that carry importance throughout the
book).
16. See id. at 278–84 (addressing three implications that follow from his predictions
about the future of law); Ribstein, supra note 8, at 810–13 (offering suggestions for over- R
coming regulatory impediments to change).
17. See SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 25 (acknowledging that speculation, personal R
prejudice, and preferences play into his predictions, aiming to provide “a collection of
provisions hypothesis about the future of legal service,” and  “leav[ing] it to [the] readers
to select what they fancy and turn . . . ideas into action”); Ribstein, supra note 8, at 777–78 R
(outlining one specific successor model while also addressing “more radical departures . . .
to illustrate the possible futures for legal services firms”).
18. See infra Part III.
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Ribstein and Susskind both foresee significant changes in the le-
gal profession.  They also both implore lawyers to embrace rather
than resist these changes.19  Ribstein emphasizes the economic neces-
sity of the changes;20 Susskind suggests lawyers may “fade from soci-
ety” without some marked change.21  Lawyers’ willingness to heed
these warnings may turn largely on the framing of the issues and how
lawyers contemplate their role in proposed solutions.
This Essay contributes to the dialogue by comparing and contrast-
ing Ribstein’s and Susskind’s analyses of the profession and by assess-
ing potential lessons for lawyers, clients, and legal educators.  Part II
reviews the current state of the legal profession and the various criti-
cisms leveled against lawyers and law firms.  Part III discusses certain
key issues raised by Ribstein in The Death of Big Law and Susskind in
The End of Lawyers?.  I acknowledge their common themes and high-
light their different approaches to framing and resolving the issues.
Part IV considers their works and the future of the legal profession in
the context of the practice of law and the lawyer-client relationship.
This Essay concludes by encouraging professionals to remain open to
changes that improve efficiency and client service.  It also stresses the
value of preserving and promoting the hallmark of being a lawyer—
that is, thinking like a lawyer.
II. THE STATE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
The U.S. economic recession of 200822 has and continues to af-
fect millions of people in almost every industry, including the legal
profession.23  As of July 2010, the overall unemployment rate was
9.5%, and of those unemployed, “roughly 6.8 million people[ ] ha[d]
been out of work for 27 weeks or more.”24  Between June 2009 and
19. See SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 269 (“I predict that lawyers who are unwilling to R
change their working practices and extend their range of services will, in the coming dec-
ade, struggle to survive.”); Ribstein, supra note 8, at 803 (“[T]he structure of the legal R
services industry has to change.”).
20. Ribstein, supra note 8, at 752 (“Big Law’s problems now extend beyond unaccom- R
modating professional rules and can be solved only by adopting significantly different busi-
ness models . . . .”).
21. SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 4 (emphasis omitted). R
22. I use the phrase “economic recession of 2008” to reference the economic turmoil
experienced in the United States and elsewhere that began in 2007.
23. See generally News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, The Em-
ployment Situation—December 2010 (Jan. 7, 2011), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.
release/pdf/empsit.pdf (outlining the current employment situation).
24. Tom Huddleston Jr., Legal Sector Lost 3,900 Jobs in June, LAW.COM (July 6, 2010),
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202463264613.
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June 2010 alone, the legal profession lost 22,200 jobs.25  And, law firm
surveys suggest more workforce reductions in the future, including
the de-equitization of partners.26
The unemployment numbers across the board are troubling.
Many commentators are asking whether the lost jobs will return, or
whether the recession triggered a long overdue rightsizing of compa-
nies that may be the new status quo.27  In the context of the legal
profession, commentators are also asking whether these market
forces, together with improved technologies, increased global compe-
tition, and increasing client dissatisfaction with law firm fee structures,
will force significant changes in the ways lawyers conduct business and
provide legal services.28
Criticism of law firm economics and client service is not new.
The dramatic growth of corporate law firms in the 1970s and 1980s,
the growing pressure on lawyers to increase annual billable hours, and
the dominance of the hourly fee structure have all raised concerns
25. Id.
26. See Zach Needles, Law Firms Predict More Layoffs Among Non-Equity Partners, Support
Staff, LAW.COM (June 23, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202462916505
(“The firms polled said they believe there are more layoffs on the horizon and that support
staff and non-equity partners remain in the crosshairs for the bulk of them.”); see also
Martha Neil, Survey Warns of Pending Partner Bloodbath: Over 33% of Responding Law Firms
May De-Equitize, A.B.A. J. (June 23, 2010, 5:47 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/arti-
cle/survey_warns_of_pending_partner_bloodbath_33_of_responding_law_firms_may_de/
(reporting that a recent Altman Weil survey indicates that “[m]ore than 33 percent of the
respondents intend to or might de-equitize partners in 2010”).
27. See, e.g., Anthony Mirhaydari, What If the Jobs Don’t Come Back?, MSN (Aug. 4, 2010,
8:00 PM), http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Investing/MutualFunds/mirhaydari-
what-if-the-jobs-do-not-come-back.aspx (“But the cruel and simple truth is that lost jobs
don’t always come back.  Look at the industrial Northeast and you might ask, is America
going the way of Detroit?”).  Although the auto industry added 55,000 jobs in the twelve
months since General Motors and Chrysler exited bankruptcy, this figure represented “less
than one-sixth the 334,000 industry jobs lost between mid-2008 and mid-2009.”  Greg Gard-
ner & Kathleen Gray, Obama Cites Progress; Chrysler to Add Jobs, FREEP.COM (July 31, 2010,
3:14 AM), http://www.freep.com/article/20100731/BUSINESS01/7310351/Obama-cites-
progress-Chrysler-to-add-jobs#ixzz0w76YdDjt.
28. See, e.g., SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 3 (“The market, in ways I discuss, will determine R
that the legal world is inefficiently resourced (under-resourced in the consumer sector and
over-resourced at the high end); it will increasingly drive out excesses and unnecessary
friction and, in turn, we will indeed witness the end of outdated legal practice and the end
of outdated lawyers.”); Ribstein, supra note 8, at 753 (acknowledging that the breakdown of R
the traditional BigLaw model was caused by “its inherent weakness and the additional
stresses imposed by the current economic environment of law practice” and noting “the
[open] question of what might replace Big Law’s traditional reputational capital model”);
see also THOMAS D. MORGAN, THE VANISHING AMERICAN LAWYER 3 (2010) (“The premise of
this book is that lawyers are facing fundamental changes in both what they will be asked to
do and whether the work they once did will continue to be done by lawyers at all.”).
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about traditional law firm practices.29  For example, in a 1987 address,
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist observed that “the number of law-
yers in the United States has more than doubled, from fewer than
350,000 in 1970 to nearly 700,000 today.”30  He then invited lawyers
and especially legal scholars to consider the implications of these de-
velopments, including the impact on lawyer and client satisfaction,
lawyer mobility, and lawyers’ ethical duties.31
Law firm billing practices are one of the primary targets for crit-
ics, who suggest that billable hours contribute to many of the profes-
sion’s ills.32  The phrase “billable hours” is shorthand for the practice
of billing clients according to the amount of hours lawyers devote to
each client’s matters.33  Accordingly, each lawyer is assigned an hourly
billable rate.  The billable rate is then multiplied by the number of
hours the lawyer works for the particular client, and the client’s fee is
calculated by adding together the billable hours of all the lawyers as-
signed to the client’s matter.34
In theory, billable hours are designed to increase the accountabil-
ity of lawyers to clients and law firms.35  The detailed accounting of
29. Cf. William H. Rehnquist, Dedicatory Address, The Legal Profession Today, 62 IND.
L.J. 151, 156–57 (1987) (noting the trend in the second half of the twentieth century “to
make the practice of law more like a business” and encouraging the legal academy to en-
gage in “careful examination” of these changes).
30. Id. at 151.  Chief Justice Rehnquist also noted that “[t]his increase is out of all
proportion to the increase in the nation’s population: in 1960 there was one lawyer for
every 627 people in the country, whereas today there is one lawyer for every 354 people.”
Id.
31. Id. at 152–57.
32. See, e.g., Stephen W. Jones & Melissa Beard Glover, The Attack on Traditional Billing
Practices, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 293, 295 (1998) (“Although simple to implement, the
use of the hourly rate, unfortunately, rewards inefficiency.”); Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Cli-
ents, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659, 705–20 (1990) (detailing numerous ways in which attorneys
deceive their clients through billing practices); William G. Ross, The Ethics of Hourly Billing
by Attorneys, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 5 (1991) (exploring “the ethical aspects of time-based
billing” and briefly offering suggestions for alternative billing practices).
33. See WILLIAM G. ROSS, THE HONEST HOUR 19–22 (1996) (explaining the historical
development of the billable hour); D. W. Darby, Jr., It’s About Time: A Survey of Lawyers’
Timekeeping Practices, LEGAL ECON., Fall 1978, at 39, 39 (noting that “[t]he predominant
basis used by successful attorneys to value their non-contingent services is time—time spent
to perform the particular service”); Dennis Curtis & Judith Resnik, Teaching Billing: Metrics
of Value in Law Firms and Law Schools, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1409, 1411 (2002) (reviewing
DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION
(2000)) (stating that “most large law firms today bill their clients on the basis of hours
worked by lawyers and paralegals, multiplied by their standard billing rates”).
34. See, e.g., YALE LAW SCH. CAREER DEV. OFF., THE TRUTH ABOUT THE BILLABLE HOUR
(2010), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/CDO_Public/cdo-billable_
hour.pdf (providing sample billable hour calculations).
35. Cf. Jones & Glover, supra note 32, at 294 (noting that billable hours are “an objec- R
tive way to measure the amount a client should owe”).
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what a lawyer does for a client—broken down in small time incre-
ments—should allow clients and law firms to understand exactly what
the lawyer did for the client and in turn justify the fee charged to the
client.36  Nevertheless, in practice, billable hours are subject to abuses,
such as overworking a client’s matter, padding hours, and multitask-
ing, and clients often lack the tools (while firms may lack the incen-
tive) to accurately monitor a particular lawyer’s billable hours.37
The potential issues with billable hours are frequently linked to
perceived flaws in the leveraged business model (otherwise known as
the pyramid model) adopted by many law firms.  Under the pyramid
model, law firms employ several nonequity lawyers for each equity
partner.38  Law firms then compensate equity partners in part through
revenue generated by the billable hours of nonequity lawyers (who are
paid on a fixed salary basis).  Essentially, law firm profits are generated
through nonequity lawyers’ billable hours.  For instance, if a none-
quity lawyer bills 2,000 hours at $200 per hour (for a total of
$400,000) and is paid an annual salary of only $200,000, the law firm
nets $200,000 above and beyond the lawyer’s salary to allocate to over-
head, partner compensation, and other expenses.39
The pyramid model can place pressure on nonequity lawyers to
produce excessive billable hours while allowing partners to receive
compensation that might not align with their contributions to clients
or the firm.40  Moreover, beginning in the late 1980s, law firms started
to retain junior lawyers who were not promoted to equity partners,
thereby increasing the number of nonequity lawyers available to sup-
port law firm profits.41  Yet, no notable methods emerged to ensure
36. See Curtis & Resnik, supra note 33, at 1412–13 (“Sophisticated clients now scrutinize R
legal bills to ferret out exorbitant charges and to prevent ‘padding’ through charges for
unnecessary work or exaggerated hourly totals.”).
37. See, e.g., Lerman, supra note 32, at 705–20 (providing examples of billing abuse); R
Douglas R. Richmond, The New Law Firm Economy, Billable Hours, and Professional Responsibil-
ity, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 207, 208–10 (2000) (suggesting that partners, as well as associates,
may be tempted to engage in unethical billing practices).
38. For information on changing trends in this model, see MARC GALANTER & THOMAS
PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM 59 (1991),
and Janet Ellen Raasch, Making Partner—or Not: Is It In, Up or Over in the 21st Century?, LAW
PRAC., June 2007, at 32, 35.
39. This is a very basic explanation for purposes of illustration only.  The economics in
practice are complicated by, among other things, the amount of time billed versus the
amount of invoiced fees collected.
40. See Raasch, supra note 38, at 34 (explaining that associates, under a heightened R
leverage structure, are pressured to bill increasingly more hours “as partners pile on the
assignments in a never-ending effort to boost [profits per partner]”).
41. Cf. id. at 33 (explaining that part of the significant trend away from the Cravath “up
and out” model is decreased opportunity for associates to obtain equity partnership).
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the necessity or quality of the work being performed for clients or
lawyers’ compliance with their ethical obligations.42
One possible response to these developments “is that so long as
the clients are willing to pay the bills, and the insurance company is
willing to insure, no outsider need question what is going on.”43  Chief
Justice Rehnquist found this response unavailing.44  Likewise, clients,
academics, and others have found it lacking and have increasingly
scrutinized law firm practices.45
The economic stress of the 2008 recession and its negative effect
on law firms appear to validate many of the concerns expressed by
clients and commentators through the years.  Several large law firms
have collapsed, and many more have downsized significantly.46  As cli-
ents have become more cost-conscious, large law firms have encoun-
tered difficulty in sustaining their traditional business models.47
Ribstein suggests that a good economy “masked” the problems of
large law firms, noting that “Big Law’s problems are long-term . . . .
The real problem with Big Law is the non-viability of its particular
model of delivering legal services.”48
Most agree that large law firms must change to survive in the cur-
rent economic environment.49  Law firms have responded by offering
42. Cf. Lerman, supra note 32, at 663–64 (noting that the “client’s relative ignorance” R
and the lack of official or public scrutiny of an attorney’s work are two factors that contrib-
ute to “opportunities for undetected deception”).
43. Rehnquist, supra note 29, at 156.
44. See id.
45. See, e.g., Marc Galanter & William Henderson, The Elastic Tournament: A Second
Transformation of the Big Law Firm, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1867, 1907 (2008) (“Although this
system is remarkably effective at maximizing the financial return on (at least some) human
capital, it simultaneously undermines or hinders other values cherished by the
profession.”).
46. See, e.g., Jason Fagone, Wrongful Death, PHILA. MAG. (May 26, 2009), http://www.
phillymag.com/articles/wrongful_death/ (discussing the dissolution of Wolf Block, “one
of the first Jewish law firms in Philadelphia, an iconic city institution”); Katerina Milenkov-
ski, What to Do When Your Firm Implodes, ABA LITIG. NEWS (Jan. 16, 2009), http://www.aba
net.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/firm-implode.html (acknowledging the dis-
solutions of Heller Ehrman LLP and Thelen LLP, two former Am Law 100 firms).
47. See LEXISNEXIS, STATE OF THE LEGAL INDUSTRY SURVEY: COMPLETE SURVEY FINDINGS 6
(2009) [hereinafter LEGAL INDUSTRY SURVEY], available at http://www.lexisnexis.com/docu-
ment/state_of_the_legal_industry_survey_findings.pdf (revealing a conflict between cor-
porate counsel, who “say law firms are not doing enough to respond to the economic
downturn,” and private practice attorneys, who “say clients are too focused on costs, at the
expense of quality and results”).
48. Ribstein, supra note 8, at 751–52. R
49. See, e.g., Needles, supra note 26 (discussing recent changes in firms that are likely to R
continue in light of the recession, including an increased emphasis on generating business
and the implementation of alternative billing arrangements); Dan Slater, At Law Firms,
Reconsidering the Model for Associates’ Pay, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (Andrew Ross Sorkin ed.,
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alternative fee structures, outsourcing services, and reducing their
workforces.50  But are those changes enough?51  Commentators de-
bate not only this question, but also the long-term outlook for the
legal profession.52  Many (including most private lawyers) believe that
the long-term impact of the recession will be nominal or nonexis-
tent.53  Others (including academics and clients) believe that the pro-
fession is experiencing a true paradigm shift.54  The truth most likely
lies somewhere between these views and is likely to depend largely on
how the profession itself responds.
Ribstein and Susskind both predict significant and fundamental
changes for the legal profession.  Whether or not critics and commen-
tators agree with their predictions, their works are thought-provoking
and worthwhile reads.  As Winston Churchill observed, “ ‘Criticism
may not be agreeable, but it is necessary; it fulfills the same function
Apr. 1, 2010, 1:17 AM), http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/04/01/at-law-firms-re-
considering-the-model-for-associates-pay/ (reporting that firms are “experimenting with
new ways to hire, train, promote and compensate associates”); Rachel M. Zahorsky, Warn-
ings Toll for BigLaw Firms Resistant to Change, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 23, 2010, 11:59 AM), http://
www.abajournal.com/news/article/warnings_toll_for_biglaw_firms_resistant_to_change/
(reporting on the “Law Firm Evolution: Brave New World or Business as Usual?” Confer-
ence hosted by the Georgetown Center for the Study of the Legal Profession, where ques-
tions such as “[w]hether firms will embrace . . . opportunities [for change], if change will
be incremental or across-the-board, and who owns the onus to lead change were all hotly
debated topics”); see also supra text accompanying notes 19–21 (noting Susskind’s and Rib- R
stein’s predictions of future change).
50. See, e.g., LEGAL INDUSTRY SURVEY, supra note 47, at 6 (“[P]rivate practice attorneys R
say their firms have taken a number of steps in 2009 to respond to the changed economic
climate,” including layoffs, alternate fee arrangements, hiring freezes, deferred start dates,
and reduced salaries).  This survey polled 300 private practice lawyers, 150 corporate coun-
sel, and 100 law students. Id. at 4.  It was conducted from October 26, 2009 through No-
vember 6, 2009. Id.
51. See id. at 6 (“71% of corporate counsel responded that law firms today are not
doing enough to respond to the current financial pressures on their business model.”).
52. See, e.g., Zahorsky, supra note 49 (discussing alternative views on the future of law R
firms offered by consultants, lawyers, academics, and service providers at the Georgetown
Conference).
53. Compare id. (“‘If you talk to most law firm leaders, they would dismiss these discus-
sions [about law firm change] and say it’s really going to be business as usual again.’”
(quoting William Perlstein, co-managing partner at WilmerHale)), with LEGAL INDUSTRY
SURVEY, supra note 47, at 7 (“53% of corporate counsel and 52% of private practice attor- R
neys believe the recession will permanently change the way business is done in the legal
industry.”).
54. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text; see also Rachel M. Zahorsky, Majority R
Say Law Practice Is Undergoing a Sweeping Evolution, Survey Says, A.B.A. J. (Mar. 26, 2010,
11:45 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/majority_say_law_practice_is_under
going_a_sweeping_evolution_survey_says (reporting on one survey that reveals that
“[w]hile not all lawyers agree the deep impressions of the economic downturn will last, the
majority is preparing for a new paradigm with significant changes to practice—whether it
be BigLaw or solo practice—and legal education”).
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as pain in the human body, it calls attention to an unhealthy state of
things.’”55
The next part of this Essay reviews the key issues raised by Rib-
stein and Susskind in the spirit of Churchill’s observation.  It high-
lights similarities and differences in their perspectives and analyzes
the potential implications of their predictions.  It also considers alter-
native outcomes that may result from their spotlighting of these very
important issues affecting the legal profession.
III. THE DEATH OF BIG LAW? THE END OF LAWYERS?
The titles of Ribstein’s and Susskind’s respective works are jarring
to many in the legal profession.  Both authors predict somewhat dire
consequences for lawyers, particularly those lawyers who refuse to em-
brace and adapt to changing economic and technological environ-
ments.56  Notably, their theses and predictions are not identical and
may provoke different reactions among lawyers.
Ribstein finds that “[t]he real problem with Big Law is the non-
viability of its particular model of delivering legal services.”57 The
Death of Big Law builds on Ribstein’s prior works that discuss the struc-
ture of law firms and the role of reputational capital in the traditional
law firm model.58  He identifies several challenges to that model, in-
cluding decreased demand for legal services, reduced “information
asymmetry” between lawyers and clients, declining reputation and
quality in large law firm services, and increasing competition from le-
gal and nonlegal professionals.59  Ribstein does not necessarily ques-
tion the value of or need for quality legal services; rather, he suggests
55. WILLIAM MANCHESTER, THE LAST LION: WINSTON SPENCER CHURCHILL, VISIONS OF
GLORY 1874–1932, 348 (1983) (quoting one of Churchill’s speeches in the House of
Commons).
56. For the most part, Ribstein and Susskind both focus on law firms and sophisticated
clienteles. See SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 1 (“My aim is to explore the extent to which the R
role of the traditional lawyer can be sustained in coming years in the face of challenging
trends in the legal marketplace and new techniques for the delivery of legal services.”);
Ribstein, supra note 8, at 752 (“The Article is not primarily concerned with the future of R
law practice or of the legal profession generally, except to the extent that these broader
developments offer alternatives to Big Law.”).  Accordingly, in assessing their respective
claims, this Essay adopts the same, somewhat narrow focus on a specific segment of the
legal profession.
57. Ribstein, supra note 8, at 752. R
58. See id. (explaining that The Death of Big Law “presents a much more pessimistic view
of the future of Big Law” than an earlier work, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm
Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707 (1998)).
59. Id. at 760–71.
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lawyers need to explore innovative methods and structures for deliver-
ing those services.60
Susskind presents a slightly different version of the impending
changes in the legal profession.  He suggests the potential for dra-
matic change not only in the model for delivering legal services but
also in the nature of legal services themselves.61  Although he envi-
sions some roles for lawyers, they are of less importance in his para-
digm.62  He implies that many of the services provided by lawyers are
generic in nature and can be performed by nonlawyers or even com-
puterized.63  He reserves only a small role for traditional legal exper-
tise, which he suggests will be needed by only a handful of clients.64
Both Ribstein and Susskind find inefficiencies in a model that
caters solely to individualized client services.65  They both urge lawyers
to diversify their approaches to providing legal services.66  Neverthe-
less, Ribstein appears to perceive greater value in lawyer participation
in that diversification than Susskind.  He encourages lawyers to de-
velop proprietary legal products67 and suggests ways for lawyers to di-
versify while maintaining the integrity of the profession, such as
60. See Ribstein, supra note 8, at 777–97 (suggesting “other ways of delivering legal
knowledge and law-related products that could provide better value to clients”).
61. See SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 1 (suggesting that in the future “conventional legal R
advisers will be much less prominent in society and, in some walks of life, will have no
visibility at all” as “[c]ommoditization and IT will shape and characterize twenty-first cen-
tury legal service”). The End of Lawyers? builds on Susskind’s prior works, including The
Future of Law. Id. at 17–19. See generally RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE FUTURE OF LAW: FACING
THE CHALLENGES OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 2 (1998) (explaining that “modern infor-
mation technologies can and should provide the basis of, and even the catalyst for, the
emergence of a quite different kind of legal service”).
62. See SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 36–39 (proposing that legal services move toward R
systematization, prepackaged knowledge services, and commoditization and limit one-on-
one lawyer-client interaction).
63. See id. at 28–33 (introducing a model to explain the five stages of evolution for legal
services and commenting that such services are becoming increasingly commoditized with
the help of existing and new information technologies).
64. Id. at 39.
65. See id. at 35 (asserting that efficiencies will increase as legal services become stan-
dardized and systematized); Ribstein, supra note 8, at 797 (“[I]t may be more efficient for R
firms to combine legal services with other activities under common ownership, where con-
trol may or may not be exercised by lawyers.”).
66. See, e.g., SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 29–32 (asserting that “high quality service, R
charged at a reasonable price and subject to regular update and maintenance, can be
delivered in standardized, systematized, and packaged form”); Ribstein, supra note 8, at R
797 (suggesting that law firms “may move beyond customized legal advice to other ways to
profit from legal expertise”).
67. Ribstein, supra note 8, at 778–82 (acknowledging that although “[l]egal knowledge R
can be packaged and sold as standardized products,” one significant barrier to such devel-
opment is “the lack of formal intellectual property protection for legal products”).
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through control shares in multidisciplinary firms.68  Susskind, how-
ever, perhaps to underscore his primary thesis, posits certain instances
in which actual lawyers provide little or no value and suggests the po-
tential for the commoditization of legal products.69
The intricacies of these various arguments are explored below
through Ribstein’s and Susskind’s comments on types of legal services,
the impact of technology on legal services, the delivery of legal ser-
vices, and the regulation of the legal profession.  This Essay’s discus-
sion of these four categories does not cover all arguments and issues
raised in Ribstein’s and Susskind’s works, but it highlights some of the
more challenging assertions to help crystallize the ongoing debate.
A. Types of Legal Services
The phrase “legal services” covers a wide spectrum of activities
performed by lawyers.  Legal services may involve, among other
things, client counseling, negotiations, research, and litigation.70  Tra-
ditionally, a specific client’s identity and legal needs determine the
type of legal services the lawyer renders during the engagement.  In
most instances, a single lawyer or law firm provides all legal services
necessary in a particular matter.  Nevertheless, the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct allows lawyers and clients to limit the scope of
legal services to identified tasks or to aspects of the engagement.71
1. Ribstein’s Perspective
Ribstein observes that law firm profitability under this traditional
approach to legal services depends largely on the relationship be-
tween the client and the lawyer and the reputational capital of the law
firm.72  The relationship component of this profit calculation presents
significant risks for the law firm: if a lawyer leaves the law firm and the
client follows that lawyer, then the law firm is left with no profit-pro-
ducing product.73  Moreover, to the extent lawyers can and do move
68. See id. at 792, 798–99.
69. SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 28–33. R
70. See, e.g., Angela M. Vallario, Living Trusts in the Unauthorized Practice of Law: A Good
Thing Gone Bad, 59 MD. L. REV. 595, 602 n.38 (2000) (pointing out that states have taken
different approaches to defining “the practice of law” and offering a list of services that
create “a presumption of rendering legal services” as defined by the D.C. Court of Appeals
(citing D.C. CT. APP. R. 49(b)(2))).
71. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(c) cmt. 6 (1983).
72. See Ribstein, supra note 8, at 753–54 (explaining the “basic reputational bonding R
model” as follows: “A law firm in effect ‘rents’” its reputation to its lawyers just as a roadside
franchise restaurant uses the franchisor’s reputation to draw customers.”).
73. Id. at 759–60 (noting the risk that partners may “‘grab’ clients and leave,” a possi-
bility which “threaten[s] law firm stability”).
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freely among law firms, individual lawyers have little incentive to con-
tribute to firm-specific reputational capital.74
Ribstein suggests law firms need to develop legal products—that
is, “[l]egal knowledge . . . packaged and sold as standardized prod-
ucts.”75  He posits that these legal products could take a variety of
forms, including law-related forms and publications, legal ideas (for
example, takeover defenses or risk-management tools), and
software.76
Alternatively, Ribstein explores the potential value in law firm re-
search and development efforts.77  Law firms could devote teams of
lawyers to creating novel approaches to client problems, exceptional
standard forms that would better suit client needs than those cur-
rently in existence, and processes for anticipating and mitigating po-
tential legal problems before they develop.78  All of these efforts
would better serve law firm clients, but Ribstein suggests the tradi-
tional law firm model “does not readily lend itself to profiting from
research and development that benefits classes of cases and clients.”79
2. Susskind’s Perspective
Susskind foresees an “evolution of legal services” in which bespo-
ken legal services—that is, “traditional, hand-crafted, one-to-one con-
sultative professional service”80—become less prominent as legal
services evolve along a spectrum that includes standardized, systema-
tized, and packaged legal products.81  At the end of the spectrum are
commoditized legal products, which Susskind defines as “an [informa-
tion technology]-based offering that is undifferentiated in the market-
place.”82  He asserts that legal services are being pulled along this
spectrum toward commoditization by market forces and information
technology advances and away from bespoken legal services.83
74. See id. at 759 (“[T]he firm’s reputation lasts only as long as lawyers gain more from
investing in it than they do from building their own clienteles.”); see also William D. Hen-
derson & Leonard Bierman, An Empirical Analysis of Lateral Lawyer Trends from 2000 to 2007:
The Emerging Equilibrium for Corporate Law Firms, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1395, 1399–1403
(2009) (summarizing data on lateral lawyer movement).
75. Ribstein, supra note 8, at 778. R
76. Id. at 778–82.
77. Id. at 782–87.
78. Id. at 782–83.
79. Id. at 783.
80. SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 29. R
81. Id. at 28–33.
82. Id. at 32.
83. Id. at 28.
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Susskind sees significant opportunity for lawyers in this changed
environment, but not in the traditional sense.84  He believes that inno-
vative lawyers can profit by systematizing and packaging legal services,
particularly online legal services:
[I]f a chargeable online legal service is developed and is of
such value and use to clients that they are prepared to pay
serious fees for its use and there are no competitor products,
then once the initial investment in the system has been
made, all later sales yield funds that are unrelated to the ex-
penditure of time and effort by lawyers.85
He acknowledges, however, that the profit opportunity could be lost if
the product becomes commoditized.86
3. Analyzing the Perspectives
Ribstein and Susskind appear to agree on the value of standard-
ized and packaged legal services, but with certain variations.  For ex-
ample, Ribstein suggests developing these products in tangible, as well
as intangible, forms and as a means to enhance client value and law
firm sustainability.87  Well-developed legal products offer a way for
firms to differentiate themselves to clients and attract investment and
financing opportunities.88  Together with investments in research and
development, legal products deepen the expertise of the law firm.89
For Susskind, packaged and, to a greater extent, commoditized
legal services are primarily online products accessible to clients with
or without lawyer intervention.  He describes these products as a po-
tential do-it-yourself legal service available as “raw material that can be
sourced from one of various [electronic or online] suppliers.”90  Rib-
stein also hints at the possibility of using artificial intelligence to de-
84. Susskind suggests that legal services can be most efficiently provided by decompos-
ing the services into identifiable tasks that are then outsourced to a variety of service prov-
iders—some lawyers and some not. Id. at 42–52. In this regard, his focus “is on the
outsourcing of legal and quasi-legal work rather than the outsourcing of back-office func-
tions.” Id. at 48.
85. Id. at 36–37.
86. See, e.g., id. at 55–56 (noting that Deloitte’s commoditization of a software product,
while beneficial to its reputation, left the firm in need of new sources of income).
87. See Ribstein, supra note 8, at 777–82. R
88. Id. at 777–78.
89. See id. at 778, 782 (arguing that law firms might “leverage their expertise by publish-
ing legal analyses, contracts, standard forms, software, codes, and other law-related materi-
als” and “by providing research and development on specific types of business
transactions.”).
90. SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 30–32. R
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velop smart legal products,91 but he does not appear to champion
automation and commoditization to the extent proposed by Suss-
kind.92  Both commentators, to varying degrees, undervalue the per-
sonal component of legal services and the fact-intensive nature of
many legal matters.93
Some clients may have similar legal issues, and clients within the
same industry may invoke similar contract forms and compliance ad-
vice.  But, no two clients are really the same.94  Most clients have indi-
vidualized needs and objectives.  While you can squeeze a client into
someone else’s form document, the fit is rarely perfect.  Thus, clients
who want legal services that address their particular potential or actual
legal problems need more than an automated response.  They need a
sophisticated lawyer who can use technology to provide the right legal
advice in a more efficient and cost-effective manner.  As discussed be-
low, technology certainly has potential in the legal context, but using
it as a substitute for trained legal judgment is problematic and ill-
advised.
B. The Impact of Technology on Legal Services
Technology undeniably is changing the way people live, interact,
and transact business.  Approximately fifty-five percent of Americans
91. Ribstein, supra note 8, at 808 (suggesting that if regulations are relaxed, “firms R
would have incentives to invest in, for example, software and data that could automate
contract drafting or aspects of litigation, or guide businesses on likely legal outcomes of
particular decisions or contract provisions”).
92. Ribstein discusses commodity legal practices, but his definition of “commodity” is
different than Susskind’s definition. Compare id. at 766 (stating that “the commodity end of
legal work[ ] includ[es] risk management, contract review, and patent searches”), with
SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 32 (“[A] commoditized legal service is an IT-based offering that R
is undifferentiated in the marketplace (undifferentiated in the minds of the recipients and
not the providers of the service).”).
93. I recognize that Susskind anticipates this critique from lawyers. See SUSSKIND, supra
note 8, at 42–43, 274–75 (explaining that a common response to his position is the notion R
that “computers cannot replace legal work”).  Notably, I am not suggesting that his observations
are completely flawed in this respect.  Nevertheless, having practiced in a large law firm for
many years and counseled numerous clients in and out of crisis situations, I think individu-
alized legal services offer more value to clients than Susskind acknowledges.
94. Admittedly, different lawyers serve different clienteles.  For some types of prac-
tices—for example, those referred to as commodity practices by Ribstein—online or auto-
mated services may satisfy some of the clients’ legal needs.  For the majority of
sophisticated business clients with complex legal matters, however, even “smart” technol-
ogy most likely falls short. See infra Part IV.  Consider, as just one minor example, a stan-
dardized or form agreement for a business acquisition that includes specific performance
as a remedy for breach of that agreement.  Even a sophisticated business client most likely
needs a lawyer’s assistance in assessing the potential enforceability of that provision in a
variety of circumstances and then factoring that risk into the value of the overall deal.
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MLR\70-2\MLR206.txt unknown Seq: 17 10-MAR-11 16:59
406 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 70:390
use the Internet on a daily basis, with most of those individuals using
e-mail and search engines.95  Computers and online databases have
altered practices at law schools and law firms alike.96  But just how far
will technology push the legal profession?97  Will the virtual law firm
become the new norm?98
1. Ribstein’s Perspective
Technology itself is not the focus of Ribstein’s work.  Neverthe-
less, he acknowledges its advancements and its role in reshaping as-
pects of the legal profession.99  For example, Ribstein implies that
technology has the potential to reduce information asymmetry be-
tween lawyers and clients through, among other things, the standardi-
zation of legal documents and the hiring of legal counsel.100
Technology may further weaken clients’ reliance on the traditional
law firm model to insure, identify, and purchase legal services.101  Rib-
stein observes that “[t]he prospect of standardization therefore may
be more a threat than an opportunity to Big Law, since it could
squeeze some of the profit from transactional work and litigation with-
out letting law firms profit from the new tools.”102
95. Catharine Smith, Internet Usage Statistics: How We Spend Our Time Online, HUF-
FINGTON POST (June 22, 2010, 12:34 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/22/
internet-usage-statistics_n_620946.html.
96. See Richard L. Marcus, The Impact of Computers on the Legal Profession: Evolution or
Revolution?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1827, 1830–35 (2008) (illustrating various impacts of com-
puters on law schools and law office operations).
97. Id. at 1864–67 (concluding with intentional ambiguity that “the revolution may be
upon us, but we cannot be sure”).
98. See, e.g., Joe Kashi, Building a Virtual Law Firm: Changes and Opportunities, LAW PRAC.
TODAY (Jan. 2004), http://www.abanet.org/lpm/lpt/articles/ftr01042.html (speculating
about the operations and services that will be provided by virtual law firms in the future).
For examples of virtual law firm models, see ANYWHERE LEGAL, http://www.anywherelegal.
com/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2011); RIMON LAW GROUP, http://www.rimonlaw.com/ (last
visited Dec. 12, 2011); and VIRTUAL LAW PARTNERS, http://www.virtuallawpartners.com/
(last visited Dec. 12, 2011).
99. See Ribstein, supra note 8, at 780–82 (“Technology potentially could transform the R
delivery of legal services.”).
100. See id. at 757–59, 781 (explaining the demand for BigLaw legal service in terms of
information asymmetry between clients and their attorneys and suggesting that technology
may ease clients’ reliance on traditional law firms and the services they provide).
101. See, e.g., id. at 760–61, 766–67 (describing the rise of legal services obtained from
in-house counsel and outsourced legal experts as two factors threatening to destabilize
BigLaw and noting that the transformation to a “horizontal” rather than “vertical” firm
structure and, in some cases, the elimination of “brick-and-mortar offices” are enabled in
part by technology).
102. See id. at 782 (referencing challenges for law firms in protecting proprietary inter-
ests in technology developed by the firm for clients’ use).
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Ribstein also views technology as an important tool in lawyer in-
novation.  Technology facilitates the timely and efficient provision of
legal services and can also form the basis of the legal product itself,
such as with online or software-based training, forms, and legal gui-
dance.103  Ribstein’s perspective that technology will form an integral
part of the legal profession’s future is evident in his predictions for
legal education: “[T]he development of legal products and the in-
creasing use of technology in law practice require technical training
that enables lawyers to do more than just litigate and give individual-
ized advice.”104
2. Susskind’s Perspective
Technology itself is very much the focus of Susskind’s work.  He
views technology as a primary driver of change in the legal profes-
sion.105  Susskind believes technology, beyond complementing the
work of lawyers, will radically change the way people give and receive
legal information.106  As noted above, his concept of commoditization
involves technology-based products that require little, if any, lawyer
participation.107
Susskind identifies several trends in technology that indicate its
inevitable dominance in the legal profession.108  Nevertheless, the
more intriguing aspects of his technology discussion focus on what he
calls “disruptive legal technologies.”109  According to Susskind, these
are “technologies (or systems, techniques, or applications) that do not
simply support or sustain the way a business or sector operates; but
instead fundamentally challenge or overhaul such a business or
sector.”110
Susskind discusses ten “disruptive legal technologies”: (1) “auto-
mated document assembly”; (2) “relentless connectivity”; (3) “elec-
103. See id. at 778–79 (pointing out that one drawback of such legal products is a lack of
intellectual property protections, which means that “[l]aw firms . . . might not get much
payoff apart from reputational or branding effects from the kinds of publications they
could produce”).
104. Id. at 814 (noting Susskind’s suggestion that “law students will need to be able to
engineer legal knowledge”).
105. SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 27 (describing “widespread uptake of information technol- R
ogy” as one of two forces that “will fundamentally transform legal service in the coming
decade and beyond”).
106. Id. at 99 (introducing the concept of “disruptive legal technologies”).
107. See supra note 62; see also SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 31–33 (discussing his definition R
of commoditization).
108. See SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 59–93 (describing trends in technology). R
109. Id. at 99.
110. Id.
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tronic legal marketplace”; (4) “e-learning”; (5) “online legal
guidance”; (6) “legal open-sourcing”; (7) “closed legal communities”;
(8) “workflow and project management”; (9) “embedded legal knowl-
edge”; and (10) “online dispute resolution.”111  His discussion of each
technology explains the characteristics that will enhance legal services
yet potentially threaten the traditional role of lawyers.112  He states
that “these disruptive legal technologies will present fundamental, un-
avoidable, and pressing challenges for most legal businesses.”113  Al-
though he sees opportunities in these developments for innovative
lawyers,114 he challenges the sustainability of “the traditional, one-to-
one consultative, advisory service that has characterized the legal pro-
fession for centuries.”115
3. Analysis of Perspectives
Both Ribstein and Susskind acknowledge the growing importance
of technology in the legal profession.  They see opportunity in tech-
nology, including the development of more responsive and efficient
legal products.  In many respects, however, Susskind builds a new le-
gal paradigm around information technology.  In that paradigm, tech-
nology—not lawyers—is the primary source of legal services.116
Lawyers are almost an afterthought.117
The use of technology by clients directly and without lawyer input
(whether live or in real-time online) raises several potential issues,
particularly for clients without in-house lawyers.  These issues include
111. Id. at 99–145, 217–24.
112. For example, e-learning can be a valuable training and marketing tool for lawyers.
Internally, law firms can use e-learning or the development of e-learning programs to train
junior lawyers. Id. at 118–19.  Externally, law firms can make these products available to
clients and use the technology for online client briefings. Id. at 120.  The risk, of course, is
that e-learning and online client briefings reduce lawyers’ direct involvement and related
fees. Id.  Similar issues exist with respect to online legal guidance.  Susskind explains that
“[t]he disruption and threat here is that clients (whether citizens or multinationals) can
obtain legal guidance online, which looks rather threatening for the traditional legal pro-
fessional which used to have something of a monopoly over the provision of legal help.”
Id. at 121–22.
113. Id. at 145.
114. See, e.g., id. at 226 (“There is an unparalleled opportunity here for innovative law
firms to extend their range of services beyond traditional reactive work to a fundamentally
different, proactive suite of services.”).
115. Id. at 144.
116. See id. at 273 (“In some areas of law, lawyers will be less dominant, while in others
(where there are, for example, online legal services or there is legal open-sourcing), they
will no longer have a role.”).
117. See id. (admitting that he does not foresee “that there will be no lawyers,” but pre-
dicting that the traditional role of lawyers will be significantly and increasingly
circumscribed).
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misapplication of legal information and incomplete (or incorrect) le-
gal advice based on the client’s failure to disclose—or the technol-
ogy’s failure to tease out—facts relevant to the analysis.  Therefore,
use of this type of technology may actually increase the need for, and
cost of, lawyers on the back end of transactions.118  It also runs
counter to the potentially valuable, yet underutilized, role for lawyers
in the business context—risk management.119  To provide effective le-
gal and risk management advice, lawyers need to talk to their clients
before the client buys a competitor, distributes its employee handbook,
enters into a contract, or the like.
Accordingly, lawyers and clients need to understand the role and
limits of online and other similar technology-based legal products.  As
suggested above, lawyers need to develop a business model that passes
on the efficiencies of these technologies to clients and in turn encour-
ages clients to collaborate with lawyers to customize those products—
and the resulting advice—to the client’s particular needs.  Ribstein’s
and Susskind’s thoughts on delivery models are discussed below.
C. The Delivery of Legal Services
Some of the oldest law firms in the United States trace their ori-
gins to the 1800s.120  Early law firms generally were small partnerships
of two or more lawyers.121  In the 1920s, the firm now known as
118. See id. at 227 (analogizing to “the tale of the chief fire officer” and noting that in a
business prone to factory fires, it may be worthwhile to pay to keep a chief fire officer on
staff instead of spending a great deal every time a destructive factory fire occurs).
119. Both Ribstein and Susskind see opportunities for lawyers in the risk management
context. SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 224–28; cf. Ribstein, supra note 8, at 783 (suggesting R
that lawyers could “engag[e] economists and other analysts to help anticipate future litiga-
tion and structure transactions to minimize litigation costs”).  For Susskind, risk manage-
ment advice would not involve traditional one-to-one type legal services, which seems at
odds with the client-specific, law firm approach of most risk management programs. SUSS-
KIND, supra note 8, at 226.  Lawyers certainly can invoke different techniques to provide R
such services (that is, face-to-face meetings are not always required or the most effective
technique), and they should collaborate with the client and the client’s other professionals
in that endeavor.  This Essay does not suggest otherwise.  Nevertheless, lawyers still need to
understand and interact with the client to provide meaningful risk management advice;
the service must be individualized on some very important levels.
120. See, e.g., Firm History, JONES DAY, http://www.jonesday.com/aboutus/firmhistory
(last visited Jan. 5, 2011) (explaining that the firm, originally Blandin & Rice, was formed
in 1893); Our Firm: History, SIDLEY AUSTIN  LLP, http://www.sidley.com/ourfirm/history
(last visited Jan. 5, 2011) (noting that Sidley Austin LLP was founded in 1866).
121. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & ANGELO DONDI, LEGAL ETHICS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 39
(2004).  Law firms initially charged clients based on fee schedules, task billing, or “eyebal-
ling” the matter; lawyers did not routinely record the time they devoted to client matters
until the second half of the twentieth century. See ROSS, supra note 33, at 12–16 (providing R
the historical background of fee schedules, task billing, and the “eyeball procedure”).
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Cravath, Swain & Moore LLP introduced a novel concept to the legal
profession: not every lawyer the firm hired would make partner.122  As
discussed above, this structure of “up or out”—commonly called a pyr-
amid structure—prevailed for most of the twentieth century.123  Even-
tually this structure gave way to an elastic pyramid approach.124  The
dramatic growth of law firms and the increasing reliance on billable
hours during the last few decades have garnered criticism and raised
questions about the value of legal services.125
1. Ribstein’s Perspective
Whereas Susskind targets the impact of technology on the legal
profession, Ribstein devotes much of his analysis to the business
model through which legal products are delivered.  He suggests the
existing large law firm model is fragile and breaking down under pres-
sure from clients, technology, and global competition.126  Neverthe-
less, he sees opportunities for law firms to restructure and implies that
these changes are necessary for law firms to remain viable business
entities.127
Ribstein posits that law firms can create value by, among other
things, deepening their knowledge base and expertise or by broaden-
ing their services beyond traditional legal services.128  In discussing in-
novation and the creation of new legal products, Ribstein suggests
greater specialization by larger law firms.  Ribstein observes opportu-
nities for firms that have the resources to invest in developing in-
depth and novel approaches to issues that commonly arise in certain
types of transactions or litigation matters.129  Ribstein acknowledges
122. Raasch, supra note 38, at 33. R
123. See supra text accompanying notes 38–42. R
124. See Galanter & Henderson, supra note 45, at 1871 (acknowledging that “the well- R
known ‘promotion-to-partner tournament’ remains a core feature of large U.S. law firms,”
but also suggesting that a new model—“the ‘elastic tournament,’ [which] involves a differ-
ent set of ground rules and ultimately includes a much larger (and mostly older) set of
players in more roles”—has emerged).
125. See, e.g., The Billable Hour Debate Is Not About the Billable Hour, ADAM SMITH, ESQ.
(Dec. 13, 2011), http://www.adamsmithesq.com/archives/2009/08/the-billable-hour-de-
bate-is-not-about-the-billable-hour.html (discussing fundamental problems with the billable
hour and offering reasons for the transition away from that scheme).
126. See Ribstein, supra note 8, at 760–77 (discussing the pressures on BigLaw and its R
unraveling).
127. Id. at 777–97.
128. See id. at 778–87 (discussing potential lines of business for BigLaw to explore, in-
cluding legal products and research and development).
129. See id. at 782 (explaining that firms specializing in certain kinds of transactions or
litigation can “capitalize on investments in issues that the firm expects to crop up repeat-
edly in its practice because it is both specialized and has a large share of the market for this
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that seizing this opportunity would require law firms to deviate from
the traditional all-purpose law firm model focused on “client-specific
work and billing.”130
In addition, Ribstein sees value in multidisciplinary and nonlaw
firms.131  Lawyers are prohibited, however, from practicing law in
firms owned in whole or in part by nonlawyers.132  This restriction lim-
its law firms’ financing options and relegates lawyers to hiring batter-
ies of nonlaw experts to address a client’s tax, accounting, and other
nonlegal needs.133  Ribstein suggests these alternative business models
would allow lawyers to join with other professionals to offer clients
“one-stop” shopping and more complete legal products.134  As dis-
cussed below, he also believes that the perceived ethical concerns with
these alternative models can be addressed in a satisfactory manner.135
2. Susskind’s Perspective
Susskind only briefly addresses the impact of his predictions on
the law firm business model.  He notes that his predictions of out-
sourcing and computerizing will mean that work currently performed
by junior lawyers at the base of the law firm pyramid structure will be
replaced, which will reduce law firms’ leverage and profits.136  He also
suggests the pull toward commoditization and technological advance-
ments may encourage large law firms to specialize and focus more on
attracting experienced, senior lawyers rather than junior lawyers, as in
the traditional pyramid model.137  According to Susskind, “the future
type of advice”); see also supra text accompanying notes 77–79 (discussing Ribstein’s per- R
spective on transforming the provision of legal services through research and
development).
130. See id. at 783.  Ribstein also urges law firms to consider financing and ownership
structures other than the traditional leverage model. See id. at 788–97.
131. Id. at 798–800.
132. Id. at 799.
133. See, e.g., id. at 798–99 (considering how a shift to multidisciplinary firms would
affect traditional firm structure and observing that “the facts that multiple types of exper-
tise can be required for the same transactions and litigation and that clients’ needs for the
services can arise unpredictably and for short time periods may make hiring a multidiscipli-
nary firm less costly than hiring the experts separately”).
134. Id. (suggesting that adding “legal advice” to large publicly traded firms could create
a “one-stop deal-making service,” which offers clients coordination and information-shar-
ing advantages).
135. See, e.g., id. at 803–04 (arguing that the ethical rule that prevents nonlawyers from
owning law firms “is unnecessary”).
136. SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 278. R
137. Id. at 278–79.  Similar to Susskind’s description of “medium-sized firms merging to
achieve a critical mass of experts,” id. at 279, Ribstein discusses the devolution of law firms
into an “all-partner,” or “horizontal,” law firm model. See Ribstein, supra note 8, at 777. R
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of very small firms whose work in [sic] not highly specialized” is the
most uncertain component in his legal paradigm.138
3. Analysis of Perspectives
Both Ribstein and Susskind predict the breakdown of the current
large law firm pyramid model.  They also observe significant value in
lawyer specialization and less focus on individualized client service.
Nevertheless, they approach the necessity for these changes in a
slightly different manner.
For Ribstein, the law firm model itself is an impediment to client
service and innovation; it does not promote efficiency or provide in-
centives for developing legal products.139  For Susskind, changes in
the large law firm model are simply inevitable consequences of his
predicted changes in legal services.140  Susskind suggests lawyers them-
selves could be the authors of this new legal paradigm.141  He is skepti-
cal, however, of lawyers seizing this opportunity in part because of
their general resistance to change and their inability to innovate.142
Although lawyers typically are not characterized as entrepre-
neurs, the practice of law has not remained stagnant over time.143  For
example, law firms have increasingly adopted new methods and tech-
nologies, and both courts and lawyers are integrating technology into
the judicial process.144  There is no indication that these advance-
ments will stop or that law firms are resisting change altogether.  Fun-
damental change, however, typically comes slowly, particularly at large
institutions.  Boutique law firms and “maverick” lawyers—both touted
as innovators by Ribstein and Susskind—likely are more nimble in
138. See SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 279. R
139. See generally Ribstein, supra note 8, at 752–77 (examining “Big Law’s inherent struc- R
tural flaws and the forces that are destabilizing it”).
140. See SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 278–79 (asserting that changes such as outsourced R
legal work “will necessitate major structural change in the long run”).
141. See id. (describing the role for expert and experienced lawyers in the new legal
paradigm).
142. Id. at 279–81 (noting that “lawyers do not find it easy to innovate, especially in the
way in which they deliver their services”).
143. For an interesting discussion of lawyers as entrepreneurs and the perceived weak-
nesses of legal education in this context, see the posts at the Minding Our Own Business
Forum, CONGLOMERATE (Apr. 2010), http://www.theconglomerate.org/masters-minding/.
144. The American Bar Association tracks technological developments in the legal pro-
fession, including in law firms and in the courts. See ABA, LEGAL TECHNOLOGY SURVEY
REPORT (2010). Like firms, lawyers often find creative ways to achieve client objectives—
both in the administrative and substantive aspects of the representation. See, e.g., Karen
Sloan, The Apprentice: Three Firms Claim Success with a New Model for Training and Mentoring
Legal Associates, NAT’L L.J., June 14, 2010, at 19, 22–24  (describing Howrey LLP’s new
apprenticeship program).
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their governance structures and client protocols and can adapt more
quickly.145  As such, larger law firms may, at times, lag behind smaller
players, but they may still have the ability to change as and when neces-
sary to meet client demands.146
To that end, Ribstein suggests lawyer regulation may in fact in-
hibit core structural changes in the law firm model that would more
readily facilitate innovation.147  His perspective on regulation is the
last point of comparison in this Essay.
D. The Regulation of the Legal Profession
The practice of law is, for the most part, regulated at the state
level.148  Lawyers’ conduct in representing clients and practicing law
must comply with the ethical rules and other standards established in
the state in which they practice.149  These regulations include strin-
gent fiduciary duties imposed on lawyers with respect to their clients
and licensing requirements for any person engaging in the practice of
law.150  The regulations are designed primarily to protect clients and
the public generally.151  Some commentators argue that they also insu-
145. See SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 280 (“Mavericks are the research and development R
departments of many law firms.”); Ribstein, supra note 8, at 786 (noting the professional R
success an attorney described as “‘sui generis,’ a ‘maverick [who] works outside the firm’s
traditional structures’” (alteration in original) (quoting Mitu Gulati & Robert Scott, Sticky
Contracts (or Why Don’t Law Firms Have R&D Departments?) (Feb. 16, 2009) (unpublished
manuscript))).
146. Lawyers typically are motivated to meet or even exceed clients’ expectations.  Most
lawyers appreciate the competitive nature of the legal profession, which existed even prior
to the recent recession, and work to satisfy clients’ demands on billing, staffing, and other
matters.  Consequently, as discussed in Part III, law firms are likely to adapt to changes
mandated by their particular clientele. See, e.g., Ed Flitton & Karen MacKay, Managing
Change: How Law Firms Are Answering the Wake-Up Call, LAW PRAC., July–Aug. 2009, at 32,
32–40 (summarizing a roundtable discussion conducted by five law firm leaders on the
challenges and opportunities accompanying changes in the legal profession).
147. See infra Part III.D.1.
148. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1303, 1315 n.34 (1995) (noting that in 1887 Alabama was the first state to
codify a set of professional standards).  For a historical analysis of the power of courts to
control the legal profession, see generally Thomas M. Alpert, The Inherent Power of the Courts
to Regulate the Practice of Law: An Historical Analysis, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 525 (1983).
149. See, e.g., MD. LAWYERS’ RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.5(a)(1) (“A lawyer admitted
by the Court of Appeals to practice in this State is subject to the disciplinary authority of
this State, regardless of where the lawyer’s conduct occurs.”).
150. See, e.g., MD. LAWYERS’ RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1–1.18 (client-lawyer rela-
tionship); MD. LAWYERS’ RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.1 (bar admission and disciplinary
matters).
151. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and
Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1981) (“Varia-
tions abound on the theme that it is consumers, not attorneys, who suffer from unautho-
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late the legal profession from outside competition, thereby enabling
arguably excessive fees and making legal assistance inaccessible to
many.152
1. Ribstein’s Perspective
Ribstein ascribes to an enabling theory of lawyer regulation.  Al-
though he acknowledges the original objectives of regulation in pro-
tecting clients, lawyers, and society, he suggests it is time to revisit
those goals.153  Specifically, he sees a productive role for market com-
petition in the legal profession—both in firm ownership structures
and the provision of legal services.154
Ribstein argues that allowing nonlawyers to own law firms would
provide financing flexibility and ease firms’ reliance on the unsustain-
able pyramid model.155  He also believes that outside ownership
would bring discipline to law firms, but not necessarily conflict with
the firm’s obligations to clients.156  He notes a variety of management
structures that firms could use to maintain compliance with legal
standards.157
Although Ribstein favors outside competition, he views prohibi-
tions on noncompetition agreements among lawyers and law firms as
a barrier to law firm value.158  A lawyer’s ability to leave a law firm
without any restrictions or penalties encourages her to invest in and
develop only self-serving legal products that will follow her upon her
rized practice and that, in the words of [former ABA President John Satterfield], ‘the fight
to stop it is the public’s fight.’”).
152. Cf., e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 3–23 (2004) (discussing the societal
and ethical consequences of “prohibit[ing] individuals who are not members of the state
bar from providing personalized legal advice”).
153. Ribstein, supra note 8, at 803 (acknowledging that the “regulation is to a significant R
extent responsible for the success of Big Law,” but arguing that such “regulation is now
hurting the legal services industry by impeding its move to a more sustainable business
model”).
154. See generally id. at 803–13 (discussing the benefits of allowing competition to pene-
trate “regulatory roadblocks that are preventing alternative models of delivering legal
services”).
155. Id. at 788–94 (outlining “potential business rationales for and some governance
logistics of outside financing of law firms”).
156. See id. at 793, 804 (proposing that law firms could be organized as unincorporated
business entities, which would have the disciplinary advantage of “substitut[ing] distribu-
tions and high-powered partner-type incentive compensation for corporate-type monitor-
ing devices like fiduciary duties, shareholder voting, and independent directors”).
157. Id. at 791–97 (describing various law firm governance options, such as manager-
managed limited liability companies and partial integration in the form of franchises, hold-
ing companies, or joint ventures).
158. See id. at 804–06 (discussing the “potentially perverse effects” that restrictions on
noncompetition agreements may have on law firm structure).
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departure.159  The policy inhibits a law firm’s ability to create valuable
legal products outside of its human capital.160  Accordingly, Ribstein
urges regulators to investigate the continued viability of existing li-
censing, ownership, and noncompetition regulations in the develop-
ing legal marketplace.161
2. Susskind’s Perspective
Susskind does not devote much attention to regulation, but this
appears to be more a result of his focus rather than his indifference to
regulation itself.  Susskind targets the future role of lawyers generally,
regardless of where they practice or what laws govern their conduct.162
His premise is that market forces and technology will overhaul the
legal profession.163  Thus, he may view regulatory changes as an inevi-
table consequence of these driving forces, in a way that is similar to his
perspective on potential changes to the large law firm model.164
Susskind does occasionally reference applicable lawyer regulation
in the United Kingdom and the United States, and he raises potential
issues with those regulations in light of his predictions.  For example,
he discusses his attendance at a seminar discussing England’s Legal
Services Bill, which proposed authorizing alternative business struc-
tures for law firms.165  At the end of that seminar, Susskind concluded
that “the delivery of legal services will be a very different business
when financed and managed by non-lawyers.”166
159. Id. at 805 (explaining that “[s]tandardized legal advice and law firm research and
development may not be protected by trade secret or copyright law and therefore might
walk out the door with departing lawyers”).
160. Id.
161. See id. at 803 (reasoning that, because BigLaw’s “traditional reputational bonding
model” has become “untenable,” changes to “the structure of the legal services industry”
are necessary, and commenting that “[w]hether and how it changes depends importantly
on regulation of the legal profession”). Alternately, Ribstein also proposes a number of
different ways in which firms and lawyers can work around the regulations until they have
been reconsidered and amended. Id. at 810 (observing that the regulations are not “an
implacable barrier” and suggesting that “[p]otential profits from eliminating the restric-
tions give competitors and consumers a strong incentive to surmount the barriers”).
162. See SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 1 (casting the work as one about the role of the R
“traditional lawyer”).
163. See id. (asserting that the conventional role of lawyers will decrease as two forces—
“a market pull towards commoditization” and “pervasive development and uptake of informa-
tion technology”—together change the nature of twenty-first century legal service).
164. See id. at 270–77 (predicting that the large law firm model must change as “new
methods, systems, and processes” emerge to influence the way in which legal work is
done).
165. Id. at 9–11.
166. Id. at 10 (emphasis omitted).
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3. Analysis of Perspectives
To realize the full extent of either Ribstein’s or Susskind’s predic-
tions, the regulations governing lawyers will need to change.  Ribstein
takes a more direct approach to this issue, urging regulatory changes
that will allow law firms to operate under what he believes are more
sustainable models.167  He also suggests regulation is a more efficient
way to implement change, rather than requiring parties to achieve
particular objectives on a one-off basis through creative contracting
and client consents.168  Susskind is less direct in his discussion of regu-
lation, but an implicit call for regulatory change follows naturally from
his predictions for the legal profession.169
It is difficult to discuss regulatory change without first assessing
what really needs to be fixed.  Ribstein and Susskind articulate
thoughtful justifications for proposed or predicted changes in the le-
gal profession.  But, in many respects, their works are a call to action
for the legal profession.  If—and to what extent—that call is answered
may determine the need for and extent of any regulatory changes.
Accordingly, the final part of this Essay considers the takeaway points
from The Death of Big Law and The End of Lawyers? and the potential
responses from the legal profession.
IV. DO LAWYERS HAVE A FUTURE?
Lawyers and the legal profession have a future.  Neither Ribstein
nor Susskind suggests otherwise.  They do each highlight, however,
different challenges to the traditional role of, and legal services pro-
vided by, lawyers.170  Moreover, they predict significant consequences
for lawyers who ignore these red flags.171
Anecdotal evidence lends some validity to the allegations of client
dissatisfaction with billable hours and the large law firm model, but
these criticisms are not new.172  The Internet provides numerous in-
stances of technological advances in legal services—from electronic
167. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. R
168. Ribstein, supra note 8, at 810–13 (discussing possibilities for overcoming regulatory R
impediments).
169. See supra Part III.D.2.
170. See supra Part III.A–D.
171. See supra Part III.A–D.
172. See supra note 32 and accompanying text; see also G. Wynn Smith, Jr., Toward Value R
Billing—An Artificial Intelligence Approach, LEGAL ECON., Nov.–Dec. 1989, at 22, 24, 27 (stat-
ing that “the Golden Age [for the legal profession] has produced certain excesses” and
concluding that “[i]n the view of many lawyers . . . the time is fast approaching when
abandonment of the 100 percent hourly billing standard not only will be desirable but also
will become inevitable”).
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client alerts to virtual law firms—but law firms have traditionally inte-
grated technologies into their processes (eventually).173  So, is there
really reason to be concerned?  It depends.
This typical lawyerly answer leads the inquiry back to thinking
like a lawyer.  Lawyers do not just dispense rote legal advice.  Not
every client has the same legal issues, and even those with similar is-
sues often require individualized advice.  The relevant questions and
the smoking gun documents often are identified only after a lawyer
probes and obtains a feel for the matter.  Standard questions and
search terms may suffice in some, but certainly not in all, cases.
A lawyer adds value to a client matter because she thinks like a
lawyer.  She possesses those key analytical skills that allow her to sit
down with a client or a set of documents and consider not only the
obvious but also the obscure details that might resolve the issue at
hand.  For example, in the transactional context, a lawyer’s key analyt-
ical skills allow her to identify, among other things, arbitrage opportu-
nities to increase a deal’s value for the client’s benefit.174  As Professor
Stephen Bainbridge explains:
For the most part, lawyers increase [value] by reducing trans-
action costs.  One way of lowering transaction cost is through
regulatory arbitrage. The law frequently provides multiple
ways of effecting a given transaction, all of which will have
various advantages and disadvantages.  By selecting the most
advantageous structure for a given transaction, and ensuring
that courts and regulators will respect that choice, the trans-
actional lawyer reduces the cost of complying with the law
and allows the parties to keep more of their gains.175
Admittedly, one perhaps could design a software or similar on-
line program to ask the client questions and then provide alternative
transaction forms for the client based on its responses.176  For some
173. See Alan Cohen, Cutting a Winning Edge in Law Firm Blogs, LAW TECH. NEWS (May 2,
2008), http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=900005634624
(finding that roughly twenty-six percent of Am Law 200 firms were blogging in some capac-
ity); Kenneth Jones, Developing a Portal to Share Firm Content, LAW TECH. NEWS (Apr. 24,
2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202430150
908 (describing a system of “data sharing among office locations” within a single firm).
174. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Function of Transactional Lawyers, PROFESSORBAIN-
BRIDGE.COM (June 8, 2009, 6:55 AM), http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbain
bridgecom/2009/06/first-kill-all-the-transactional-lawyers.html (explaining the value ad-
ded by transactional lawyers).
175. Id.
176. See SUSSKIND, supra note 8, at 121–25 (discussing online legal guidance, “[o]ne of R
the most obviously disruptive legal technologies”); Ribstein, supra note 8, at 780–82 (dis- R
cussing the potential market for legal service technologies).
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clients and some transactions this may work.  But, for many transac-
tions—which today are global in scope, subject to numerous and
often competing laws, and involve multiple and often changing par-
ties—that software likely would not be the best or even most efficient
option.  Saving a few thousand dollars on legal fees pales in compari-
son to the costs of litigation and potential liability from an ill-struc-
tured deal.
This example is intended to highlight two points: First, one of a
lawyer’s most valuable legal products is her ability to think like a law-
yer; and second, broad prescriptions for the legal profession likely are
unworkable.  As lawyers and clients consider Ribstein’s and Susskind’s
works, they should reflect on these points.  Specifically, they should
weigh heavily Susskind’s suggestion that there will be less need for
traditional bespoken legal services in the future.177  Individualized cli-
ent service need not be face-to-face and certainly can be streamlined
by technology, but lawyers and clients need to appreciate the inherent
value in that service.178
Recognizing the potentially ongoing value of individualized cli-
ent service does not necessitate a complete disregard for the issues
raised by Ribstein and Susskind.  Rather, it frames the challenge fac-
ing lawyers in a more familiar context—the lawyer-client relationship.
How can lawyers continue to provide meaningful legal solutions for
clients in a changing economic and technological environment?  Rib-
stein and Susskind both offer hints as to how lawyers might answer this
challenge.179
Accordingly, as Ribstein proposed, law firms need to re-evaluate
internal economic incentives and external fee structures.180  Does this
mean abandoning the large law firm pyramid model?  Perhaps.  For
many firms it likely means continued right-sizing, reallocating re-
sources, and finding alternative billing structures that pass on the
value of technological efficiencies to clients.181  For some law firms,
however, their fire power in “‘bet the company’” litigation and trans-
actions may enable them to sustain the status quo.182
177. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text. R
178. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. R
179. See supra Part III.D.1–2.
180. See supra notes 155–57. R
181. See supra note 50; see also Smith, supra note 172, at 24, 27 (describing a computer- R
ized billing system developed by one firm to implement “value billing”).
182. See Henderson & Bierman, supra note 74, at 1398–99 (noting that “a large number R
of law firms appear to be ‘betting the firm’ on attracting sufficient quantities of ‘bet the
company’ lawsuits”).
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Likewise, regulators should consider Ribstein’s invitation to inves-
tigate and better understand whether lawyer regulations correspond
to the realities of the marketplace.  The key question here is whether
regulatory changes to restrictions on competition better protect cli-
ents and the public generally or expose them to increased manipula-
tion and abuse.183  In many respects, this is a cost-benefit analysis that
could benefit from empirical studies, which may be feasible as differ-
ent countries revamp their regulatory regimes for the legal profes-
sion.184  It also is not an all or nothing proposition.  For example, as
Ribstein suggests in the nonlawyer ownership context, multidiscipli-
nary firms may be a possible compromise solution that facilitates
outside investment—but only by other professionals presumably held
to reasonable professional standards of conduct.185
Overall, Ribstein and Susskind give lawyers, clients, and legal edu-
cators much to ponder.  Some change is inevitable, but not all of the
changes predicted in the works discussed here are likely or desirable.
As suggested above, clients with a short-term perspective may favor
more outsourcing, nonlawyering, and computerizing, but those devel-
opments might not be in the long-term best interests of clients.  The
use of technology and alternative business forms, as well as any regula-
tory changes, should be guided by the goal of improving both the
efficiency and the quality of legal services.  One without the other does
a disservice to clients.  And, the hallmark of being a lawyer—thinking
like a lawyer—is the perfect tool for assessing and adopting new
means to achieve that goal.
183. See, e.g., Ribstein, supra note 8, at 803–04 (noting in relation to ethical rules restrict- R
ing nonlawyer ownership of law firms that “clients might fare better from capitalist-owned
than from lawyer-owned firms, since capitalists would be focused on serving client needs
rather than in maximizing lawyers’ role in providing these services”).
184. See, e.g., News Release, Ministry of Justice of the U.K., Law Firms to Allow Non-
Lawyer Partners (Mar. 31, 2009), http://www.justice.gov.uk/news/newsrelease310309b.
htm (announcing that in the United Kingdom “[f]or the first time, by forming Legal Disci-
plinary Practices (LDPs), law firms can be owned by different types of lawyers, and a pro-
portion of non-lawyers”); cf. Gina Passarella, Will U.K. Management Trends Influence U.S. Law
Firms?, LAWJOBS.COM  (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.lawjobs.com/newsandviews/LawArticle.
jsp?hubtype=News&id=1202474333189&Will_UK_Management_Trends_Influence_US_
Law_Firms&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1 (reporting on new models used by British firms that
decrease client costs by outsourcing legal work to small regional firms and by creating firm
subsidies that offer less expensive services by top lawyers, and wondering whether Ameri-
can firms will similarly embrace the managerial or “quarterback” role in providing legal
services).
185. See Ribstein, supra note 8, at 798 (“Many types of experts other than lawyers can R
contribute to litigation and transactional work, including economists, accountants, finan-
cial analysts, business consultants, psychologists, medical doctors, and actuaries.”).
